Fact Check: Are Boko Haram Suspects On Army And Police Recruitment Checklists?

On November 26, 2025, during a special plenary session of the House of Representatives on Nigeria’s worsening security situation, former Deputy Speaker Ahmed Idris Wase alleged that suspected Boko Haram members and other criminals, including armed robbers and gang members, had in the past been found on recruitment lists for the Nigerian Army and Police.

Representing Wase Federal Constituency in Plateau State and speaking as leader of the North Central Caucus, he said such infiltration exposes deep flaws in recruitment procedures, allowing dangerous individuals to enter key security institutions and weaken counterinsurgency efforts.

He cited former House Committee on Defence Chairman Muktar Betara as a witness, recalling that “there were moments in time when, in the process of recruitment, Boko Haram were found in the list.”

Speaking emotionally and referencing personal losses to terrorism, Wase urged politicians to endorse only candidates with “good character and integrity.”

The allegation has triggered public concern and demands for investigation, with widespread media coverage and debates on X amplifying calls for reforms in security recruitment.

As of November 27, 2025, neither the Nigerian military nor the police have issued a denial, leaving the claim unchallenged but in need of deeper examination.

What the evidence shows

Independent reports from the plenary session confirm that Wase made the statement during broader deliberations on insecurity, which included presentations from the North West, North East, and South South caucuses.

There has been no official response from Betara or the security agencies, although the session’s focus on a coordinated security strategy aligns with Wase’s call for stricter political vetting.

While the specific incidents Wase referenced have not been confirmed through declassified documents or new investigations, historical evidence strongly supports the possibility of attempts by Boko Haram members to infiltrate Nigeria’s security forces.

In 2012, authorities in Maiduguri, Borno State, detained 11 soldiers suspected of Boko Haram links, with investigations showing some had enlisted under false identities.

In 2014, the Army court-martialed several personnel over alleged ties, including passing information to insurgents.

Former Adamawa Governor Murtala Nyako even accused the federal government of allowing sympathizers into military formations.

Further examples followed. In September 2016, the Department of State Services arrested two suspected Boko Haram operatives attempting to join the Army as recruits.

In April 2024, a repented Boko Haram member, who had been reintegrated and enlisted into the Army, was accused of killing a woman in Enugu barracks. Although the military issued a statement clarifying aspects of the case, it exposed vulnerabilities within reintegration and recruitment systems.

The Nigeria Police Force has faced similar risks, including 2014 reports of officers selling weapons to Boko Haram associates. These patterns, often tied to mass recruitment exercises in conflict-prone areas and weak background checks, reinforce Wase’s concerns and highlight persistent institutional gaps.

Why it matters

If Boko Haram suspects infiltrate the Army or Police, the consequences could be devastating. Insurgents could gain access to intelligence, undermine operations, and launch insider attacks that prolong Nigeria’s 15-year conflict, which has claimed more than 35,000 lives and displaced millions.

Past incidents, such as the 2018 Metele base attack where over 100 soldiers were killed amid suspicions of internal leaks, show how compromised recruitment can contribute to ambushes, improvised explosive device placements, and strategic failures.

Infiltration also creates distrust among personnel, forces repeated internal purges, lowers morale, and weakens public confidence in the nation’s security institutions. This further complicates the 52 percent insecurity burden Wase attributed to the North Central region.

What should be done

Nigeria needs immediate and long-term reforms to close these vulnerabilities. Recruitment processes should adopt independent, technology-driven verification systems, including biometric databases and AI-supported screening, to limit political interference.

Mandatory psychological tests and polygraph assessments should be introduced to verify loyalty and identity. A dedicated counterintelligence unit is necessary to continually monitor personnel for insider threats.

Lawmakers should initiate a detailed investigation through the House Defence Committee to verify Wase’s claims, while the executive branch must reassess reintegration programs for former insurgents. Addressing deeper structural issues, such as economic deprivation and environmental pressures, raised by North West Caucus leader Sada Soli. will be essential for reducing extremist recruitment over time.

Verdict

Plausible and urgently demanding investigation. Wase’s allegation, although awaiting official confirmation of specific incidents, is reinforced by more than a decade of documented infiltration cases that reveal longstanding recruitment weaknesses in Nigeria’s security system.

Without prompt investigations and reforms, such breaches risk worsening the insurgency. Strengthening verification and accountability is necessary to protect Nigeria’s defence architecture.